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PEND OREILLE COUNTY
HEARING EXAMINER

IN RE:

DETERMINATION OF NONSIGNIFICANCE
FOR STATUTORY COMPREHENSIVE
PLAN UPDATE.

**POST-HEARING BRIEF OF PEND
OREILLE COUNTY**

I. INTRODUCTION

The Determination of Nonsignificance (the “DNS”) issued on April 22, 2021 by Pend Oreille County (the “County”) for its statutorily required update to its Comprehensive Plan, Development Regulations, Environmental Sensitive Areas Ordinance, Future Land Use Map and Zoning Map (the “Update”) should be affirmed.

The sole issue for resolution in this appeal is whether the DNS was based upon information reasonably sufficient to determine the environmental impact of the Update. RG*NEW failed to meet its burden of proof to show that the County’s decision to issue the DNS for the Update was clearly erroneous and was based upon insufficient information. There are no probable, significant adverse environmental impacts that will result due to the

1 Update. The County made the *prima facie* showing of its compliance with SEPA that it was
2 required to make.

3 The County's use of a Determination of Nonsignificance for changes to its land use
4 regulations is nothing new. Similar to the land use changes proposed in the Update, in 2018
5 the County initiated an application to change land that was designated and zoned as a "public
6 land" to other land use designations in compliance with the County's Comprehensive Plan.
7 *See, e.g.* CPU-18-001 (the "2018 Application"). The County issued a Determination of
8 Nonsignificance for the 2018 Application (the "2019 DNS"). RG*NEW appealed the 2019
9 DNS to the Hearing Examiner alleging many of the same errors as it does in the instant
10 appeal, including suggesting that "street talk" about a contemplated smelter that could be
11 constructed in the County was a "proposal" requiring environmental review as part of the
12 2018 Application. Despite the allegations that the County engaged in incomplete
13 environmental review, the Hearing Examiner affirmed the 2019 DNS via a decision dated
14 September 25, 2019.
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17 RG*NEW once again attempts to argue that the County engaged in incomplete
18 environmental review. This is contrary to the record. Remarkably, they go so far as to
19 introduce an untimely Declaration of Robert Allen Rumsey (the "Rumsey Declaration")
20 which provides unverifiable statements and conjures up impressions of a party who did not
21 testify at the hearing before the Hearing Examiner in an attempt to advance their case. As
22 discussed below, the Rumsey Declaration should be struck in total because the Appellant fails
23 to provide any support for the quotations.
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25 Unlike Appellant's unverifiable or speculative statements, the record establishes:
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1 (i) The County followed SEPA in preparing an environmental checklist for the
2 Update based upon the information available to it at the time;

3 (ii) The DNS considered the specific circumstances and information available to
4 the County at the time of the issuance of the DNS, therefore satisfying the procedural
5 requirements of SEPA;

6 (iii) The County engaged in meaningful environmental review in connection with
7 the proposal as required by WAC 197-11-055;

8 (iv) The County considered the cumulative environmental impacts of the Update;

9 (v) The County's Responsible Official, Community Development Director Greg
10 Snow, could identify no probable, significant adverse environmental impacts that warrant the
11 preparation of an environmental impact statement;

12 (vi) The County is committed to engaging in full environmental review of any
13 future proposal as required by SEPA and has the authority to do so in the future; and

14 (vii) None of the evidence presented by RE*NEW during the course of the hearing
15 caused Greg Snow to change his mind regarding the issuance of the DNS.

16 The evidence submitted by the Appellant fails to establish that the DNS was clearly
17 erroneous; therefore, they do not meet their burden of proof.

18 Even if Appellant had met their burden of proof, Appellant claims that the only
19 outcome here is to remand this matter for the County to consider additional evidence of
20 remote environmental impacts that they seem to think are important. Such conclusion defies
21 the requirements under SEPA that local jurisdictions employ the "rule of reason" when
22 conducting environmental review with the County vested with the responsibility to consider
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1 what level of environmental review is adequate. The County’s analysis was reasonable under
2 the circumstances and within the scope of review that is ordinarily permitted under SEPA.

3 The County’s DNS was issued on the basis that there was no probable, significant
4 adverse environmental impacts that it could identify as a result of the Update. The County
5 received no comments containing any specific evidence of environmental impacts to the
6 contrary, nor did any evidence presented by RE*NEW during the course of the hearing cause
7 Mr. Snow to change his mind regarding the issuance of the DNS. For the reasons set forth
8 herein, the DNS issued by the County should be affirmed.

9
10 **II. DISCUSSION**

11 A. The County is Entitled to Deference for its Decision to Issue a DNS.

12 RCW 43.21C.075(3)(d) requires that the “procedural determinations made by the
13 responsible official shall be entitled to substantial weight.” RCW 43.21C.075(3)(d). In
14 addition, RCW 43.21C.090 provides that “the decision of a governmental agency shall be
15 accorded substantial weight” in any “attack on a determination by a governmental agency
16 relative to the absence of the requirement, or the adequacy of a ‘detailed statement ...’” *See*
17 *also Norway Hill Preservation & Protection Ass 'n v. King Cnty. Council*, 87 Wn.2d 267, 275
18 (1976) (acknowledging the clearly erroneous standard “will allow a reviewing court to give
19 substantial weight to the agency determination as required by RCW 43.21C.090”),
20 *superseded by statute on other grounds*. The standard that the responsible official must meet
21 is that there was prima facie compliance with the procedural requirements of SEPA. *Sisley v.*
22 *San Juan County*, 89 Wn.2d 78, 84, 569 P.2d (1977).
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1 Under the “clearly erroneous” review standard, courts will only overturn the agency's
2 determination if, “after reviewing all the evidence, it is left with the definite and firm
3 conviction that the agency committed a mistake.” *Lands Council v. Wash. State Parks &*
4 *Recreation Comm 'n.*, 176 Wn. App. 787, 795 (2013).

5 Accordingly, the threshold determination (a procedural determination) issued by the
6 County shall be accorded substantial weight. The County complied with the procedural
7 requirements of SEPA. The decision by the County to issue a DNS was not clearly erroneous
8 and should be affirmed.

9
10 B. The DNS Was Not Clearly Erroneous.

11 The DNS issued by the County was not clearly erroneous. The Appellant has not met
12 their burden. The County reviewed the relevant information that it had on the Update and
13 determined that there was no probable, significant adverse environmental impact that would
14 occur.

15
16 The evidence before the County at the time of the issuance of the DNS established that
17 (i) there was a “proposal” to amend its Comprehensive Plan, Future Land Use Map,
18 Development Regulations and Zoning Regulations, (ii) there was a SEPA checklist that
19 disclosed the environmental impacts associated with the proposal based upon the information
20 that could be reasonably ascertained by the Responsible Official at the time of SEPA review;
21 (iii) the Responsible Official received no comments containing specific environmental
22 impacts (let alone those that would be probable significant adverse environmental impacts
23 requiring an EIS); (iv) no agency with expertise submitted any comments indicating that the
24 issuance of a DNS was inappropriate, (v) the cumulative impacts of all amendments under
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1 consideration by the County to amend its land use codes were considered; and (vi) the end
2 result of this environmental review was to issue the DNS.

3 This is *prima facie* proof of SEPA compliance by the County. *See, e.g. Boehm v. City*
4 *of Vancouver*, 111 Wn.App. 711, 718 (2002). SEPA does not impose any additional
5 requirements beyond the outcome arrived at by the County.
6

7 C. The SEPA Checklist Was Completed With the Information Possessed by the County
8 at the Time of Completion.

9 1. *SEPA Review is Based Upon the Applicant's Own Knowledge and*
10 *Observations.*

11 Appellant asserts the County's alleged deferral of identification of environmental
12 impacts to a future point in time when the impacts are actually known is not permitted under
13 Washington law. Checklists, however, are supposed to be based upon "applicant's own
14 knowledge and observations." RICHARD L. SETTLE, THE WASHINGTON STATE
15 ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY ACT, § 13.01[4][c]. As Professor Settle points out, "do not know"
16 and "'does not apply,' where appropriate, are acceptable responses." *Id.*

17 The County engaged in a two-year public process before it ever assembled the SEPA
18 checklist. The public process included numerous workshops and meetings, many of which
19 were attended by members or affiliates of the Appellant. *County Exhibit 11, Greg Snow*
20 *Testimony*. As the County pointed out in its testimony, the County completed the checklist
21 based upon its own knowledge and its own available observations, which occurred only after
22 the completion of the two years' worth of public process. *Greg Snow Testimony*.
23

1 2. *The Rule of Reason Does Not Require the County to Assess Remote and*
2 *Speculative Impacts.*

3 Appellant further contends that the County lacked information to assess impacts. As
4 Professor Richard Settle notes, lacking information and a cumulative impact analysis has the
5 potential to infinitely expand environmental review:

6 Unless reasonably limited, requiring the analysis of
7 conceivable cumulative impacts of conceivable future
8 proposals could infinitely expand the scope of environmental
9 review. Thus, SEPA limits the scope of environmental review
10 to impacts that are “probable” and “significant.” And the
11 impacts of potential future proposals must be cumulatively
12 assessed only when the instant proposal would be a necessary
13 antecedent for such future proposals. Most fundamentally, the
14 scope of cumulative impact analysis is limited by the rule of
15 reason that does not require assessment of remote and
16 speculative impacts.

17 R. Settle, *The Washington State Environmental Policy Act: A Legal and Policy Analysis*,
18 §14.01[1][c][iii] (emphasis added). When considering a non-project action, the agency
19 conducting the environmental review must consider the maximum potential development
20 under various zoning classes; however, not every remote or speculative consequence need be
21 considered. *Heritage Baptist Church v. Cent. Puget Sound Growth Mgmt. Hr’gs Brd.*, 2 Wn.
22 App.2d 737, 753, 413 P.3d 590 (2018). The probability of significant impact is a
23 determining factor in whether an environmental impact statement is required. *King County v.*
24 *Wash. State Boundary Review Bd.*, 122 Wn.2d 648, 662 - 663, 860 P.2d 1024 (1993).

25 Appellant contends that merely because the colors on the Future Land Use Maps and
26 Zoning Maps change, that the County is going to be inundated with land use applications and
27 an influx of growth. Changing the colors on the map does not alleviate a future project’s
28 obligation to comply with county regulations; for example, the County’s Environmentally

1 Sensitive Areas Ordinance. As Mr. Snow pointed out at the hearing, 65% of the County is
2 currently in public ownership. The County has no evidence that suggests that any of the
3 public owners have an interest in divesting themselves from ownership. *Greg Snow*
4 *Testimony*. The County also has no evidence to suggest that even if ownership in public land
5 was divested to a private landowner that it would be developed. *Greg Snow Testimony*. In
6 fact, Pend Oreille County anticipates that growth will continue to remain slow. The County
7 plans for a continued growth of approximately .3% per year based upon the Office of
8 Financial Management. This equals 45 people per year. *Greg Snow Testimony*. Mr. Snow
9 further testified that he was aware that there were new potential uses that could be allowed if
10 the Update were adopted by the County. *Id.*

11
12 The only evidence that Appellant supplied of future development is a suggestion that
13 there could be some type of land swap between a private landowner and the United States
14 Forest Service. *See Appellant's Exhibit 27*. First, the Appellant provided no testimony about
15 the anticipated timing of such transaction. Second, the Appellant provided no testimony that
16 even if such transaction occurred that there would be any changes to the land use. Finally,
17 the County has only generally heard of such transaction and has no specifics about the
18 acquisition. *Greg Snow Testimony*. Such speculative evidence is not required to be
19 considered by the County under SEPA.
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22 3. *The County has the Authority to Review Subsequent Implementing Actions.*

23 Appellant further claims that the County is required to analyze the impacts of the
24 Update to the greatest extent possible. SEPA does not require the County to engage in
25 environmental review of all conceivable environmental outcomes that could occur based upon
26

1 the Update. To do so would require the County to go beyond the “rule of reason” in its
2 evaluation of potential environmental impacts and defy the requirements under SEPA that
3 local jurisdictions are subject to when conducting environmental review. The County’s
4 commitment to engage in environmental review at a future point in time is not prohibited by
5 SEPA. To the contrary, this commitment to engaging in environmental review in the future
6 supports SEPA’s requirement that the environmental review be meaningful.
7

8 When considering a zoning action, a delay of full implementation of the
9 environmental policies of SEPA until the development permit stage is allowed, provided that
10 the governmental entity has the authority to implement those policies at the permit stage and
11 so long as the environmental consequences of any development of the property are disclosed
12 and considered at the time the zoning action is taken. *Ullock v. Bremerton*, 17 Wn. App. 573,
13 584 - 585, 565 P.2d 1179 (1977) (quoting *Narrowsview Preservation Ass’n v. Tacoma*, 84
14 Wn.2d 416, 526 P.2d 897 (1974)); *Hayden v. Port Townsend*, 93 Wn.2d 870, 879, 613 P.2d
15 1164 (1980).
16

17 An instructive case is *Spokane County v. Eastern Wash. Growth Management*
18 *Hearings Bd.*, 176 Wn.App. 555 (2013). In *Spokane County*, a property owner submitted a
19 site specific application to Spokane County to amend the comprehensive plan and rezone to
20 allow for the use of their property as a bistro, together with an expansion to allow an asphalt
21 driveway, drive-through espresso service and a parking lot. *Spokane County*, 176 Wn.App. at
22 562-63. Spokane County prepared the SEPA checklist noting that future environmental
23 analysis would be required if there were future developments proposed. *Id.* The Court of
24 Appeals stated that the County’s environmental review (and the underlying checklist) was
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1 improper because the future intended use of the property was known. *Id.* at 580-81. The
2 adoption of the amendment “approved the property’s existing nonconforming use, thereby
3 affecting the environment.” *Id.* at 581. In fact, the Court of Appeals in *Spokane County* cited
4 Professor Settle about when it is acceptable to delay environmental review:

5
6 An agency may not postpone environmental analysis to a later
7 implementation stage if the proposal would affect the environment
8 without subsequent implementing action. RICHARD L. SETTLE,
9 THE WASHINGTON STATE ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY ACT §
10 13.01[1], at 13-15 to -16 (1997 & Supp. 2010; see WAC 197-11-
11 060(5)d)(i)-(ii).

12
13 *Spokane County*, 177 Wn. App. at 579 (emphasis added). The Court of Appeals
14 invalidated the actions by Spokane County because the adoption of the Comprehensive Plan
15 amendment allowed for known and quantifiable impacts to be realized in the event that it was
16 adopted.

17
18 *Hayden v. City of Port Townsend* is instructive. In *Hayden*, the City of Port Townsend
19 was considering the adoption of a rezone. *Hayden v. City of Port Townsend*, 93 Wn.2d 870,
20 873, 613 P.2d 1164 (1980), overruled on other grounds by *Save a Neighborhood Environment*
21 (*SANE*) *v. City of Seattle*, 101 Wn.2d 280, 676 P.2d 1006 (1984) is instructive *Id.* In
22 conjunction, the responsible official issued a “negative declaration” or a Determination of
23 Nonsignificance, since the rezone was not an action that would significantly affect the quality
24 of the environment. *Id.* The Court, citing *Ullock v. Bremerton*, stated “[n]onproject rezoning
25 has been held not to require an EIS as long as the council retains the authority to require such
26 an evaluation at the project permit stage.” *Id.* at 879. The court affirmed the issuance of the
27 determination of nonsignificance because the rezone application itself carried with it no
28 specific building permit. *Id.*

1 The County retains full authority to engage in project level review. It disclosed in the
2 SEPA checklist that the County would consider project level review at the appropriate time.
3 This would occur when the County was presented with an application and the existence of
4 environmental impacts could be ascertained and analyzed. The analysis the courts have
5 engaged in under *Spokane County* and *Hayden* provide insight into the level of environmental
6 review required in connection with nonproject actions. In *Spokane County*, it was known that
7 as a result of the adoption of the comprehensive plan amendment and rezone that a use would
8 be commenced and the specific environmental impacts that would occur. The specific
9 impacts of the use that would be permitted as a result of the adoption of the comprehensive
10 plan and rezone were probable. In *Hayden*, the City had no specific proposal in hand
11 therefore a determination of nonsignificance was appropriate.
12

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14 In the instance of the Update, the potential for future proposals is unknown. The
15 record establishes that the County expects that growth will continue to be slow. *Greg Snow*
16 *Testimony*. Where appropriate, the known environmental impacts were disclosed by the
17 County.

18 D. Appellant's Evidence was Considered by the County.

19 1. *County Provided an Extensive Public Participation Process.*

20 Appellant used the hearing for the purpose of submitting numerous exhibits claiming
21 that the County was engaging in a shortened environmental review process. To the contrary,
22 the County has engaged in a lengthy public review process beginning in June 2019. The
23 County accepted public comments during the course of Planning Commission meetings and
24 workshops since June 11, 2019. *See County Exhibit 11, p. 709*. It also accepted written
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1 comments and considered those as part of the environmental review process. *See County*
2 *Exhibit 9*. The County also prepared a matrix that showed the comments submitted by the
3 public and the responses that the County had to each of the comments. *See County Exhibit*
4 *13*. Only after it engaged in the lengthy public process did the County prepare the
5 environmental checklist and issue the DNS.
6

7 2. *Appellant's Disagreement with the Environmental Review Does Not Mean that*
8 *it Did Not Occur.*

9 Appellant claimed the County erred in not considering a number of environmental
10 impacts that it advanced at the hearing.

11 First, the County has the deference to weigh and balance what those aspects of
12 environmental review that it thinks are important. RCW 43.21C.075(3)(d). This means that
13 the County can weigh and balance those prospective environmental considerations that it
14 thinks are important. Merely because the Appellant states that there are potential
15 environmental impacts (climate change, potential fire hazards), does not mean that they were
16 not considered by the County. In fact, both climate change and potential fire hazards were
17 considered by the County as evidenced by the very documents that the County is working on.
18 For example, the draft Update, dated February 2021, expressly considers and develops
19 policies associated with climate change (*County Exhibit 3, POC 00052*) and fire hazards
20 (*County Exhibit 3, POC 00084*). In other circumstances, Appellant alleged that certain
21 impacts were not disclosed in the County's SEPA checklist (e.g. bull trout) but were plainly
22 disclosed in the SEPA checklist. *Testimony of Tracy Morgan; County Exhibit 12*. The level
23 of precision and disclosure that Appellant requests is not required by SEPA. *See, e.g. WAC*
24 *197-11-335*.
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1 Second, in some cases Appellant's claim that the County did not consider an
2 environmental impact simply was not true. Appellant submitted the testimony of Mr. Woody
3 Myers to support its assertion that the Washington State Department of Fish and Wildlife
4 ("WDFW") was not consulted as part of the update to the Environmentally Sensitive Areas
5 Ordinance. *See Testimony of Woody Meyers.* The County testified that WDFW was
6 consulted as the "first step" for the update to the Environmentally Sensitive Areas Ordinance.
7 *Testimony of Greg Snow; Testimony of Ben Floyd.* Moreover, the County provided a copy of
8 the SEPA checklist to the Department of Ecology for publication in the SEPA register.
9 *Testimony of Greg Snow.* WDFW provided no comments on the SEPA checklist or the DNS
10 issued by the County. *Id.*

11
12 The Appellant's appeal is driven by their disagreement with the outcome of the
13 Update and does not mean that the environmental impacts were not considered as part of the
14 environmental review. The judgment of the Appellant as to the adequacy of the record on
15 environmental review cannot be substituted for that of the County's.

16
17 3. *Supplemental Evidence Provided by Appellant is Not Evidence of a Proposal*
18 *or Significant Environmental Impacts.*

19 Appellant attempts to supplement the record with colloquy and the unverifiable
20 statements of individual residents of the County. The County objects to the additional
21 evidence that was submitted well after the closing of the record. The County further objects
22 to the inclusion of the Rumsey Declaration as being direct quotes from the purported County
23 Commissioner meeting without actually providing either the recording or the notes of Robert
24 Allen Rumsey as supporting exhibits. In fact, on its face the Rumsey Declaration admits that
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1 it is not verbatim and likely inaccurate (“The quoted statements below are precisely what was
2 said or nearly so, with no substantive alteration”) (emphasis added).

3 The County disagrees with specific statements attributed to Greg Snow. *See*
4 Declaration of Greg Snow. Portions of the Rumsey Declaration contain the impressions of a
5 witness and do not constitute admissions made by the County and therefore should be struck.
6 *See, e.g.* Declaration of Robert Allen Rumsey, Paras. 10, 11, 12, 17, 18, 19, 20, 22, 26, 29.
7 Remarkably, the Appellant goes so far as to make up an unverifiable impression of the
8 conduct of the Commissioners to suggest that the County does not respect the authority of the
9 Hearing Examiner in this matter (i.e. “The Commissioners were very animated and excited
10 during this exchange, as if they already knew the outcome of the appeal before the Hearing
11 Examiner and were celebrating”). Statements such as these cannot be and should not be a part
12 of the record of the completeness of the environmental review conducted by the County. In
13 addition, any additional statements that were made by a single County Commissioner are not
14 a statement against interest. ER 804(b)(3). No single Commissioner is vested with the
15 authority to bind the County.
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18 Moreover, the Appellant’s claim that these statements are the equivalent to projects in
19 the County being immediately ready to go following the adoption of the Update. That is not
20 the case nor is it supported by the evidence of the County that growth within the County is
21 largely limited. *Greg Snow Testimony; County Exhibit 4, POC 000034*. Appellant argued
22 this same point in connection with an alleged smelter in connection with the 2018
23 Comprehensive Update. *See* Hearing Examiner Decision, CPU-18-0001, p. 30. A suggestion
24 that there may be developers ready to immediately commence construction after the adoption
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
1 of the Update is the same “street talk” about a future project that was previously held to
2 establish that no project existed. Declaration of Greg Snow; *Id.*

3
4 **IV. CONCLUSION**

5 The Appellant failed to meet its burden of proof to show that the County was clearly
6 erroneous in issuing the DNS. The record supports the fact that the County made a *prima*
7 *facie* showing of its compliance with SEPA. The County engaged in the meaningful
8 environmental review required by SEPA. It satisfied the procedural requirements associated
9 with SEPA by preparing an environmental checklist for the Application. It issued a threshold
10 determination based upon those environmental impacts that could be meaningfully evaluated.
11 For the reasons set forth herein the DNS should be affirmed.

12 DATED this 17th day of December, 2021.

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14 KUTAK ROCK, LLP

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17 By: 
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19 Brian E. Kistler, WSBA No. 36811
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1 **CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE**

2 I certify under penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of Washington that on the
3 17th day of December, 2021, I caused a copy of the foregoing POST-HEARING BRIEF OF
4 PEND OREILLE COUNTY to be served on the following by the method indicated:
5

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VIA ELECTRONIC MAIL

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27 /s/ Colleen R. Sebo

Colleen R. Sebo

28 POST-HEARING BRIEF OF PEND OREILLE
COUNTY - 16

4861-2282-3942.4

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